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Historical Bafflement of the Chinese People
June 6, 2009 in A Year of Anniversaries by The China Beat | No comments

David Kelly, researcher at the University of Technology Sydney, translated the following opinion piece
by overseas political commentator Liang Jing. He has published several previous pieces at China
Digital Times, including, “Trigger for an Earthquake in Chinese Society” and “Where Does Wen Jiabao’s
Faith Come From?”

One of the most significant cultural phenomena in Chinese society in recent years is the growing
interest in history. Everyone—elite and general populace, leftists and rightists—shows an
unprecedented enthusiasm for understanding China’s past. And in 2009 a series of major
historical anniversaries, including the 90th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement, have
pushed China’s “historical fever” to new highs. One of the major reasons stimulating the keen
interest in history is that the “reforms” that followed June Fourth, returned China to a “preliberation” scenario almost overnight: bureaucratic corruption, moral bankruptcy, social
injustice; to the point that, in some important aspects, such as higher education, the status quo in
China is not as good as the KMT era, and many phenomena that people thought could not
happen again, such as prostitution and the sale of official posts, not only occur, they do so on a
far greater scale than in the past.
History has played a big joke on the Chinese, who having experienced countless sufferings and paid
the price in countless lives, rather than gaining social progress with their bloody struggle, have turned
full circle to find themselves back where they started. How exactly did this come about? Not only the
elite, but also many ordinary people are puzzled by this problem. This historical puzzlement of
unprecedented numbers of people is what drives China’s historically unprecedented “public history
movement.”
The heroes emerging from this enlightenment are a group of intellectuals who have consciously and
unconsciously enhanced the public’s knowledge of history. The role they play in promoting China’s
social progress may far exceed that of the elite in control of the current political discourse. Two figures
who, in my opinion, well represent these “modern heroes”, are Yi Zhongtian, and Shi Yue, who
wroteThings Ming under the pen name Dangnian Mingyue [Moonlight Back Then]. One thing these two
writers of very different age and experience have in common is use of modern mass media, to tell
ordinary people, honestly and wittily, the true logic of the Chinese history in layman’s language. They
not only subvert the “proper history” as repeatedly distorted by China officialdom, but also upgrade
the “unofficial history” of China to new levels, because their telling of Chinese history is imbricated
with the spirit and values of modern civilisation.
The old tales retold by Yi Zhongtian and Shi Yue, are clearly a cultural rebellion not only against the
official historiography and its materials, but against the CPC’s political message as well. Because they
tell people—the younger generation in particular—there are no differences in human terms between
the emperors of thousands of years ago and the big shots in the political arena today; no political
figures, therefore, should be mystified or treated as sacred. The CPC rulers understand the political
implication of this cultural rebellion, of course, hence do not allow the likes of Yi Zhongtian to extend
their historical fascination to the CPC’s history. As relations between the KMT and the CPC ease,
however, more restricted areas of history are being broken, and as the fruits of research of the
network of overseas Chinese continue to break the CPC blockade, a new generation of intellectuals in
the PRC can see more and more of the whole picture of China’s modern history.
Even so, optimism about the Chinese people waking up from their historical bafflement, and avoiding
being led into another great disaster is hardly called for. The level of materials and artifacts of the
China of 90 years ago cannot be compared to today’s, of course; but the degree of political tolerance
of those in power, the morale and ideological independence of academia, the energetic spirit of young
people in China of that day, were incomparable greater than now. Had they seen the deference and

obedience of faculty and students “dancing attendance” upon Hu Jintao when he came to Chinese
Agriculture University on May 3, the students and scholars who took part in the May Fourth Movement
would have given it a thumbs down.

The paradox of history is that the historical responsibility for China’s subsequent big disasters
lies precisely with the movers and shakers of the May Fourth Movement 90 years ago. So, today,
many of China’s intellectual elite hold severely critical attitudes towards May Fourth cultural
radicalism, arguing that cultural conservatism should be the guideline for China’s future
development.
I accept that cultural radicalism takes some of the blame for the disasters of the last century, but fail
to understand the actual proposals of cultural conservatism. Will cultural conservatism be able to
succeed where cultural radicalism has failed? Such simplistic thinking is disturbing. Connected to
China’s present realities, the regime controls unprecedented resources, and has formed a huge
bureaucratic class who are incapable of providing basic social security to the majority of the
population. Officials in Guizhou prostituting young girls [1], profiteers in Ningxia suborning judges in a
joint fraud [2]—appalling scandals like these show that the regime is losing its governing capacity.
What does it actually mean to call for cultural conservatism it such times? Won’t a day come when the
Chinese people, once again falling into historical bafflement, find that when making a stand is called
for, no one is there to make it?
* Liang Jing, “Zhongguoren de lishi kunhuo” [Historical bafflement of the Chinese people], 5 May 2009
[梁京：“中国人的历史困惑”， 2009年5月 5日.]
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